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TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD IN FLUX. 
ASSESSING COMING OF AGE THROUGH AN 
HISTORICAL LENS IN FINLAND AND FRANCE.
Tranzicije u odraslost u stalnoj promeni. Pristup 
odrastanju kroz istorijsku perspektivu u Finskoj i 
Francuskoj
ABSTRACT: According to youth experts, a significant number of contemporary 
young people  in Western societies reach adulthood at a later age than previous 
generations. This phenomenon is generally perceived as a temporary misstep on the 
path todefaultpatterns of transition establishedin the 1950s and 1960s. Giventhe 
current societalcontext, should the transition to adulthood today really conform to 
that model? This paper provides an historical analysis of transitionsto adulthood to 
enqui re whether the post-war model canstill be considered a meaningful reference 
today. Were routes of transition similar or different in earlier times, or hasthe 
model always existed? To answer this question, the paper looks at demographics 
in two case countries, Finland and France, in three periods: the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the 1950s–1970s, and the early twenty-first century. 
The paper argues that the post-war generation’s rapid patterns of transition 
w ere unique, resulting from a sustained period of economic growth in developed 
societies. Thishas generatednew pathways of transition and a model of adulthood 
still used as a standardpoint today, even though the current socio-economic context 
haschanged. Transitions to adulthood are not static. They have always evolved, 
mirroring the wider historicalcontext within which individuals operate.
KEY WORDS: transitions to adulthood; historical comparison; Finland and 
France
APSTRAKT: Prema istraživačima omladine, značajan broj današnjih mladih u 
zapadnim društvima dostižu odaslost kasnije nego u ranijim generacijama. Ova 
pojava se uopšteno shvata kao privremeno odstupanje od uobičajenih putanja i 
obrazaca tranzicije koji su ustanovljeni pedesetih i šezdesetih. Uzimajući u obzir 
sadašnji društveni kontekst, postavlja se pitanje da li tranzicije u odraslost treba 
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zaista da se prilagođavaju tom modelu? Ovaj članak pruža istorijsku analizu 
tranzicija u odraslost da bi se ispitalo da li posleratni model treba shvatati kao 
referentni okvir danas. Da li su putanje tranzicije bile slične ili drugačije u ranijim 
vremenima ili je ovaj model oduvek postojao? Da bi se odgovorilo na ovo pitanje, 
u radu se proučavaju demografski trendovi u Finskoj i Francuskoj u tri perioda: 
devetnaestom i ranom dvadesetom veku, u periodu 1950–1970s, i u ranom 
dvadesetprvom veku. Tvrdi se da su obrasci brze tranzicije posleratne generacije 
bili jedinstveni kao posledica održivog perioda ekonomskog rasta u razvijenim 
društvima. Iz njih je proizašao model tranzicija i odraslosti koji se uzima kao 
standardni i danas, iako se izmenio socioekonomski kontekst. Tranzicije u odraslost 
nisu statične, one su se uvek razvijale reflektujući šire istorijske kontekste u kojima 
pojedinci žive. 
KLJUČNE REČI: tranzicije u odraslost; istorijsko poređenje; Finska i Francuska
Introduction
Transitions from adolescence to adulthood from the 1950s to the 1970s in 
Western societies were brief, clear and straightforward. The majority of youth 
became adults by fulfilling specific markers in a short period and particular 
order: they finished school, found a job, became financially independent, left 
the parental home, settled down, got married, and had children. Compared to 
previous generations, a large number of contemporary young people achieve 
transitions to adulthood at a later age, and often fulfil markers of adulthood in 
an unconventional order. The phenomenon of youth prolongation, starting in 
the 1980s, has been discussed amongst scholars, economists and policy-makers 
(e.g. Arnett, 2004; Baudelot, 1988; Côté, 2000; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; 
Galland 1990; Helve and Bynner, 1996; Jones, 1995).
The pathways of transition experienced by baby boomers serve as a reference 
point to which current transitions are compared. However, were transitions in 
earlier times alike? Existing historical data calls for a revision of the current 
discourse on youth prolongation. Although the historical context, ways of life 
and life expectations differ, strong parallels can be drawn with the current 
situation. Young people in the early twentieth century more likely experienced 
what would now be considered nonlinear, delayed, blurred, and heterogeneous 
transitions, rather than ordered and short like in the 1950s–1970s.
An empirical doctoral dissertation comparing youth transition in Finland 
and France (Mary, 2012), with a focus on female university students, showed 
that early twenty-first century pathways to adulthood were similar in the 
two case countries, and also matched most of the patterns observed in other 
advanced societies. The main findings suggest a change in the understanding 
and undertaking of adulthood. The informants distinguished the psychological 
dimension of adulthood from the social dimension, and mostly associated 
adulthood with a mental state. Several studies show that for a growing number 
of young people, adulthood comprises a combination of subjective psychological 
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characteristics and social roles,as opposed to the current notion of adulthood 
that validates young people as adults upon achieving quantifiable roles rather 
than subjective proficiencies(e.g. Andrew et al., 2007; Hartmann and Swartz, 
2007; Molgat, 2007; Shanahan et al., 2005).
These findings provoked further questions: How were transitions achieved 
in earlier times? Why are transitions extending today? Is the phenomenon new 
and unique? The historical dimension of transitions to adulthood lack in the 
literature. Few studies assess transitions before the 1980s. The purpose of this 
paper is to contribute to that missing aspect. The paper examines demographics 
in three historical periods in Finland and France to observe and assess the 
transformations of transitions to adulthood across time. Data concentrate on 
demographics on family formation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
1950s–1970s, and early twenty-first century.
History shows changing patterns of transition in the present times are 
neither an exceptionnor anintentional disruption. The wider societal context has 
transformed since the 1970s. Time-specific socio-economic demands force the 
youth to forge pathways to adulthood adapted to the current context. The post-
war model of transition nevertheless remains unquestioned and continues to set 
up the archetypal framework for contemporary pathways to adulthood (Blatterer, 
2007b, 2007c; Furstenberg et al., 2005; Wyn, 2004). Contemporary transitions 
are implicitly viewed as a transient destabilisation of established socialand 
cultural norms (e.g. Anatrella, 2003; Furedi, 2003).The prolongation of youth 
also worries policy-makers and economists, especially regarding the continuity 
of the welfare state. The latter relies on an economically active population and 
the contribution of the younger generation(e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1999).
The paper argues that there is no right or wrong way to become adult. No 
model of adulthood can be conferred the status of reference model. Theperception 
that young people are deliberately delaying their entry into adulthood reflectsan 
outdated understanding of transitions to adulthood from another historical 
period within different societal conditions.The current evaluative framework of 
transition and the model of adulthood thus requires updating and redefining 
(Andrew et al., 2007; Blatterer, 2007a; 2010; Mary, 2012, 2014; Wyn, 2004).
The paper is structured as follows: first, it introduces the major socio-
economic transformations that have occurred since the nineteenth century 
in Finland and France.Then it considers the methodological approach and 
challenges. The third section examines historical demographics to glean a new 
understanding of perceptions of adulthood. This is followed by a summary of 
thegeneral evolution of transitions in advanced societies.
Major societal transformations in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in Finland and France
The paper focuses on transitions to adulthood in two case countries, Finland 
and France. The two countries present distinguishable features in their societal 
backgrounds. Both are Western European societiesfounded upon democratic 
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ideologies, members of the European Union, and share many features at the 
infrastructural level. However, both countries have been shaped from different 
directions. They adopted different types of welfare regimes – conservative in 
France and social democratic in Finland (Esping-Andersen, 1999). France is 
rooted in Roman Catholic traditions, while Finland adopted the Lutheran faith. 
In France, the state and the church have operated separately since the 1905 
Law  on the Separation of the Churches and State, based on the principle of 
‘laïcité’ (secularism) (Legifrance, 2018). In Finland, the state and the church have 
been separated since the Church Act of 1869 (Suomen evankelis-luterilainen 
kirkko, 2018). Both countries were agrarian before the industrial revolution but 
modernised at different paces. Industrialisation began in the early nineteenth 
century in France and in the mid-nineteenth century in Finland. Socio-
infrastructural development was similar in both societies after the Second World 
War. While France had a colonial empire, Finland belonged to two empires: to 
Sweden until 1809, and then to Russia until the country gained independence in 
1917. Additionally, France participated in the initiation of the European Union 
with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 
and the European Economic Community (EEC) established in 1957. Finland 
maintained its neutrality until joining the Union in 1995. In 2001, both countries 
converted their national currency to the common European currency, the euro 
(European Union, 2018).
After the Second World War, Finland and France, like other advanced 
societies, experienced an unprecedented period of economic growth from 
1945 to approximately 1975, referred to as the Golden Age of Capitalism. 
During this period, every level of society underwent major transformations. 
Standards of living and healthcare systems were greatly improved and expanded, 
welfare regimes were implemented, national infrastructures modernised, 
and transport, technology and information mechanisms made unparalleled 
progress. Advanced societies changed at the political, educational and cultural 
levels too. Mores and values became more permissive, and women and children 
gain rights and protection. Simultaneously,youth become more visible. New 
sectors developed around young people in terms of education, socio-politics, 
industry, consumption, and popularculture (Chauvel, 2002; Galland, 1990). 
Both countries were affected by the worldwide economic slowdown following 
the oil crisis of the1970s. In France, like in other Western Europeans countries, 
economic decline continued into the 1980s, while economy continued to expand 
in Finland (Statistics Finland, 2007b). Finland’s economy got greatly affected by 
the collapseof communism in the 1990s, before it took off again. France was 
less touched by that major event, but the lasting worldwide economic stagnation 
continued to have a harmful impact. The economy of both countries suffered 
from the worldwide financial crisis of 2007–2008.
Schooling became free, mandatory and secular for all children aged six to 
thirteen in France in 1881. This was extended to the age of 16 in 1959 (Ministère 
de l’Educationnationaleet de la jeunesse, 2018). In Finland, education became 
free and compulsory to all children for six years in 1921. In the 1970s, it became 
compulsory from age seven to sixteen (Finnish National Agency for Education, 
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2018). During the 1960s in advanced societies, education expanded as a result 
of policies aimed at reducing social inequality and increasing equal educational 
opportunities (Teichler, 2007: 26). Higher education became accessible to lower 
socio-economic groups and women. The development of the service sector 
in the 1960s and 1970s increased the demand for highly educated people and 
provided white-collar jobs that required qualifications higher than manual, blue-
collar jobs.
Developed societies shifted to service-based economies, with the service 
sector overtaking the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, during the Golden 
Age. Over two-third of the population worked in the primary sector (agriculture, 
forestry, fishery) in Finland and France in the 1800s and early 1900s (see Table 
1). In the 1920s–1930s, the secondary sector (industry and construction) and the 
tertiary sector (services) developed considerably in France, and the population 
worked equally in all sectors. The Finnish economy remained primarily agrarian 
until the 1970s. Since the 1970s in both countries, as in other European societies, 
their economies are almost entirely service-based. The service sectornow 
employs about three quarters of the labour force. The agricultural sector involves 
only a small number of workers, and the industrial sector less than a quarter.
Table 1. Proportion (percentages) of the labour force per economic sectors in 
Finland in 1860–2017 and France in 1800–2017 (rounded numbers).
Finland France
Sectors 1860 1920–30 1980 2017 1800–10 1920–30 1980 2017
Primary 80 60 13 4 65 32 8 3
Secondary 14 20 33 23 20 34 31 16
Tertiary 7 20 54 73 15 35 61 81
Sources: Eurostats (2018a); Hjerppe (1989); Marchand and Thélot (1991); StatisticsFinland 
(2007).
Western societies started to establish systems of public assistance before 
the First World War. Welfare state regimes were established after the Second 
World War in all Western countries. Development was slower in Finland until 
the Second World War, but expenditure increased in the 1970s–1980s, while it 
stagnated in Franceduring those years (Tomka, 2003). The efficiency of welfare 
systems depends heavily on a strong and stable economic apparatus. According 
to Esping-Andersen (1999), welfare systems in Western societies are slowly 
eroding because of economic stagnation and the requirements of a growing 
population in need.
Methods and data
As per the results obtained in the above mentioned study (Mary, 2012), the 
debate on youth prolongation, and the ongoing reference to the 1950s–1970s 
model of adulthood strongly invited to question the criteria shaping the concepts 
of youth and adulthood. In order to develop a deeper understanding of current 
patterns of transition, demographics on family formation and studies connected to 
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transitions in Finland and France, with references to other Western societies, were 
investigated in three time periods: the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
1950s–1970s, and the early twenty-first century. The study examines the following 
demographics: age at first marriage, age of women at birth of first child, fertility 
rate and age of majority. There exists little historical demographic data prior the 
Second World War, but sufficiently to offer insights generating profound reflexions 
upon the pathways to adulthood taking place today.
The historical data presented in the paper is based on approximate 
estimations, as the format of the historical statistics obtained is not compatible 
for accurate comparison with present times, let alone cross-country comparison. 
The paper relies essentially on secondary sources of data, as access to primary 
historical data sources were limited. Most information was collected by the 
church in earlier times, and little data was recorded on demographics. Population 
censuses were initiated in Finland and France in the eighteenth century but 
remained infrequent and incomplete. Only after the Second World Wardata 
collection became more extensive, and methods of collection and measurement 
more accurate. Historical data also present inconsistencies in definitions. 
Transitions to adulthood, for instance, were not much investigated before the 
1980s. The concept was not identified as it is currently, similarly to the concepts 
of childhood and adolescence, which respectively became recognised in most 
advanced societiesin the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (Ariès, 1962; 
Kett, 1973). The purpose of the paper is to conduct a sociological analysis on 
the evolution of transitions to adulthood from a historic perspective. Historic 
statistics and facts are used with an illustrative and qualitative approach rather 
than a quantitative focus.
Results and analysis
The 1950s–1970s witnessed more uniformed patterns of transition amongst 
the youth than in previous times. Pathways to adulthood today appear scattered, 
and are largely heterogeneous, depending on socio-economic backgrounds, 
gender, ethnicity, education level, or geographical location. Looking at historical 
demographics reveals that this is not uncharacteristic.
Transitions throughout history
Table 2. Indicators of family formation in Finland and France, 1850s–2017 
(rounded numbers).
MEAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE 
1855 1930 1970 1990 2000 2010 2017
Finland
Women 251 25 23 25 28,5 30 32
Men 271 28 25 27 31 32,5 34
France
Women 26 23 23 26 28 30 312
Men 30 27 25 28 30 32 332
1Data for 1881–91. 2Data for 2016.
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MEAN AGE OF WOMEN AT BIRTH OF FIRST CHILD
1910 1950 1961–65 1980 1981–85 2000 2010 2016 EU 28
Finland - - 23 - 25 27,5 28 29 29
(2016)France 25 24,5 - 24,5 - 27,5 28 28,5
TOTAL FERTILITY RATE
1900 1950 1970 1990 2000 2017 EU 28
Finland 4,9 3,2 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,5 1,6
(2017)France 2,9 2,9 2,5 1,8 1,9 1,9
PROPORTION (%) OF LIVE BIRTHS OUTSIDE MARRIAGE
1960 1980 1990 2000 2010 2016 EU 28
Finland 4 13 25 39 41 45 43
(2016)France 6 11 30 44 55 60
Sources: Bellamy (2015); Eurostat (2018b, 2018c); Legoyt (1863); Miettinen (2011); Pison 
(2010); Rothenbacher (2002); Statistics Finland (2010, 2018); Tomka (2013);Toulemon et al. 
(2008); Volant (2017).
Average age of marriage
In both Finland and France, people married at a later age in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries than one might expect. In Finland, the average age 
at first marriage in 1881–91 was 27 for men and 25 for women (Koskinen et 
al., 2007: 141). In France in 1855, men married on average at 30 and women 
at 26. This average decreased in both societies from the 1950s to the 1970s. In 
1970, in Finland and France, the average age at marriage for men and women 
was 25 and 23 respectively. This started to increase again in the 1980s. In the 
1990s the figures equalledthose of the 1900s. Today, age at first marriage has 
reached unprecedented levels: 34 and 32 for men and women in Finland, and 33 
and 31 for men and women in France (see Table 2). Based on data provided by 
official sources such as Eurostat and OECD, these later developmentsare broadly 
consistent with the experiences of other advanced countries.
In the nineteenth century in Western societies, household formation did not 
occur until the late 20s for a significant number of women and the early 30s 
for most men. Most young people had obligations towards their family, in the 
form of economic support. Moreover, men needed time to accumulate sufficient 
capital and resources to support a family of their own, and women could not 
marry without presenting a dowry to their future husband (Goody, 2000: 63–64; 
Model et al., 1976: 16). The obligation for men to attend military service (up to 
three years in France), eventual studies, inheritance laws, and parent consent, 
also delayed marriage (Legoyt, 1863).
The 1950s witnessed a drop in the age of marriage and the emergence of the 
nuclear family structure. This reinforced fixed gender roles and division, with 
a male breadwinner, a female homemaker, and generally two children (Coontz, 
2005; Fussell and Furstenberg, 2005: 31). This model was adopted by the 
majority of young adults during the Golden Age. In the 1970s, it was disrupted 
by the massive participation of women in higher education and the labour force, 
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and mores and values connected to living arrangements such as living and/or 
having children in a consensual rather than in an official union (Coontz 2005). 
While societal context and ways of life are not comparable, today’s transitions 
resemble in some ways those of early industrial times. A large number of young 
people are in a similar situation: working, accumulating capital, and still living 
with their parents. However, a century ago young people helped their parents 
financially. Today, it is parents who provide economic and material assistance to 
their grown-up children (Ray and Settersten, 2010: 32).
Fertility and median age of women at childbirth
In Finland in the early 1800s, both women aged 25–29 and 30–34 accounted 
for most births. A large proportion of women also gave birth at age 35–39, more 
than did women aged 20–24. Patterns remained unchanged until the 1950s. Both 
women aged 20–24 and 25–29 then accounted for most births. Since the 1980s, 
birth patterns have returned to earlier historical trends, with most women giving 
birth at the ages of 25–29 and 30–34, and the proportion of births at the age of 
20–24 decreasing. Since 2009, most women give birth at age 25–29 and 30–34, 
much more than at 20–24 (Miettinen, 2011). France displays similar tendencies. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, most women gave birth at 25–29 and 
30–34 and older. During the 1950s, the number of women giving birth before 24 
increased, but never overtook the number of births among the 25–29 age group. 
From 1980 onwards, trends returned to earlier tendencies, with most women 
giving birth at 25–29 and 30–34 (INSEE, 2018) (see Table 2). Figures show that 
the mean age of women at first birth was 23 in Finland in 1961–65, and 24,5 in 
France in 1950. In both countries, this rose from the 1980s, reaching respectively 
29 and 28,5 in Finland and France in 2016.
The socio-cultural context largely differed in the 1900s. Morals, family values 
and expectations, lack of contraception and high infant mortality constrained the 
lives of women. Women also had a larger number of children, and more closely 
spaced births. Nonetheless, data shows that the 1950s–1970s trends linked to 
marriage and childbirth were an historical exception (see Table 2). Fertility rates 
follow parallel trends in Finland, France and other Western societies, being much 
lower than at the turn of the twentieth century, and reaching the unprecedented 
low point of 1,6 in the European Union in 2016. The proportion of births outside 
marriage is noteworthy too. While out of wedlock births were illegal in earlier 
times, today,45%of children in Finland and 60% of children in France are born 
outside marriage. France is a pioneer regarding this trend.
Age of majority
The age of majority in most advanced societies is 18 years old. Nevertheless, 
this specific age has been attributed as the legal transition to full citizenship 
only recently. The age of consent and legal age of marriage without parental 
consent have followed similar patterns. In France, before the French Revolution, 
the age of majority was 25 for both men and women. In 1792 and 1974, it was 
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respectively reduced to 21 and then 18 (Planiol, 1950 [1899–1901]). In Finland, 
before the 1700s, the age of majority for men was 15. Between the eighteenth and 
twentieth century it was increased to 21. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, 
women were not considered independent citizens and legally depended on their 
parents and then husband. In 1864, they received recognition as independent 
citizens from age 25. The age of majority was reduced to 20 in 1969 and 18 in 
1976 for both genders (Finlex, 2018; Talve, 1997).
Variations in the age of full entitlement to citizenship reveal historical 
perceptions of adulthood. While young people fulfilled qualifiers that would 
entitle them to adulthood today, such as working and getting married, they 
were not necessarily considered fully-fledged adult citizens – especially women. 
Transitions to adulthood remained ambiguous. Most of those marrying were 
also conferred adult status by the community upon displaying signs of maturity, 
personal qualities and skills (Shanahan et al., 2005: 229). Historical trends 
provide evidence on the evolution of the concept of adulthood and framework 
of transitions. Transitions are not static but malleable features shaped by the 
evolution of society at large.
The post-war generation: unique patterns of transitions
After the Second World War, western societies experienced a phase of 
reconstruction and unprecedented socio-economic opportunities and security. 
Unparalleled socio-institutional transformations took place and strongly 
impacted the preceding routes to adulthood and framework of transitions 
(Chauvel, 2002). Prosperous economies, abundance of work, and access to higher 
education that guaranteed employment enabled early entry on the labour market 
and family formation. The pacing of transitions to adulthood metamorphosed 
in Finland and France but also other advanced societies. Transitions in the 
1950s–1970s became shorter, more concentrated, and situated earlier in life; 
much more than in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Young people 
managed to achieve milestones simultaneously: the majority of youth entered 
the labour force, got married and had children almost at the same time, and 
at a younger age. Most young men and women were recognized as adults by 
their early 20s, both socially and economically (Model et al., 1976: 20; Ray and 
Settersten, 2010: 21).
Preparation for adult responsibilities was more extensive in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in Western societies.Model et al. (1976: 16–17, 
20) stress that the non-familial status transitions, such as leaving school and 
entering the labour force, started earlier and required slightly less time to reach 
completion than in the 1950s–1970s. Children entered the labour force in parallel 
of schooling, or as soon as compulsory schooling ended, usually helping their 
family or relatives. However, the familial transitions, including leaving home, 
getting married and household formation, started later and required considerably 
more years for completion. A greater proportion of young people lived at home 
with their families in both the early twentieth and twenty-first centuries than 
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in the mid-twentieth century. While in the 1950s–1970s most marriages took 
place in people’s early 20s, a substantial proportion of women and most men did 
not marry until their late 20s or early 30s in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries (Model et al., 1976: 15–16; Ray and Settersten, 2010: 23).
The post-war period provided the necessary circumstances for particular 
transition pathways to be experienced homogeneously and in a condensed 
manner by the majority of young people. Only then did coming-of-age become 
associated with attaining stable work, individual financial independence, 
marriage and parenthood in a concentrated period. This in turn led to the 
emergence of new markers of transition and a new model of adulthood that 
gained normative validity. This particular model became institutionalised and 
deeply rooted in the collective imagination of advanced societies. It further 
became a standard reference against which the process of transition in younger 
generations are still compared and judged, even if the societal conditions have 
changed (Blatterer, 2007a: 6, 2007b: 774–778, 2010: 46–48; Ray and Settersten, 
2010: 23; Wyn and Woodman, 2006: 498).
Misjudged pioneer routes to adulthood 
Substantial cultural, economic, and demographic forces have altered the 
landscape and opportunities of young adults since the 1980s. The flourishing 
period of the Golden Age gave the illusion that a bright socio-economic 
future was guaranteed. However, prosperity did not last. The oil crises in 
the 1970sdestabilised the socio-economic edificeand gave rise to economic 
stagnation and inflation. These dynamics generated a climate of uncertainty 
and competition compromising young people’s possibilities to undertake the 
expected adult roles (Chauvel, 2002).
Nevertheless, the current definition of adulthood is based on a notion of 
adulthood that conceives social roles as routinized expectations, while being 
adult increasingly encompasses following a journey, and lifelong learning and 
development (Hartmann and Swartz, 2007: 277–278; Pallas, 2007: 190–193). 
The youth increasingly experience heterogeneous transitions, with some still 
achieving the traditional markers of adulthood at a fairly steady pace and young 
age, while others feel and act as responsible adults but do not fulfil the classical 
adult status.
Although it is increasingly difficult to follow the 1950s–1970s archetype in 
the current uncertain socio-economic context, the new routes of transition young 
people adopt are discarded and perceived as a temporarymistake that might be 
rectified in the future. The transition pathways experienced by the previous 
generation are still considered a benchmark by the dominant discourse and the 
youth are suspected of sabotaging the established model of transition (see e.g. 
Blatterer, 2007a, 2007c, 2010; Wyn. 2004). As such, Ray and Settersten (2010: 
36) stress that “much of the media attention and public debate on the subject of 
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the changing transition to adulthood start from the assumption that something 
is wrong with young people today as they take longer to ‘grow up,’ that the ‘fault’ 
is of their own doing.” However, young people neither intend to disrupt the 
post-war model of transition nor prolong their youth. Advanced societies have 
undergone profound and complex transformations that have deeply affected the 
framework of transitions and the process of socio-economic integration. Young 
people are therefore pursuing alternative and strategic pathways to adulthood 
more suitable to current socio-economic demands (Furlong et al., 2011: 361; 
Mary, 2014: 426–427; Wyn and Woodman. 2006: 511).
Social concepts are deeply rooted in and shaped by wider societal and 
historical dynamics. Each generation reacts and adapts to the circumstances they 
are confronted with. The experience of the baby boomers was the destiny of one 
particular generation, and cannot apply to the younger generations, whose lives 
are shaped by a thoroughly different socio-economic context. The 1950s–1970s 
markers of adulthood are increasingly irrelevant in the present era, as much 
as the pre-war markers became unsuitable to the youth born after the Second 
World War.
Discussion: transitions to adulthood 
mirror socio-historical change
The aim of this paper was to provide additional knowledge on the historical 
dimension of transitions to adulthood. The paper looked at demographics 
in Finland and France in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
1950s–1970s, and the early twenty-first century to get a deeper understanding of 
the evolution of transitions. Generalisations are difficult to establish. However, 
seeing the similarities in the experience of coming of age in present times 
(attested by international data and youth experts), and the comparable wider 
socio-economic and infrastructural transformations that Finland, France, and 
other advanced societies experienced in the past two hundred years, some 
conclusions about transitions throughout history can be drawn to other Western 
societies too. This section thus offers a more general discussion on the evolution 
of transitions throughout time.
Bourdieu (1980: 144) argues that the concepts of youth and old age are socially 
materialised echoes of the struggle between younger and older generations, and 
that social concepts aresocially constructed rather than biologically founded. 
Mauger (2010: 9–11) adds that notions of age and generation have acquired a 
variety of meanings, depending when, where and by whom they are used. In 
the early nineteenth century, the definition of adolescence was broader, applying 
to youth from their middle teens to their middle twenties. The current span 
covered by adolescence – thirteen to nineteen years old – narrowed from the 
1870s onwards (Kett, 1973: 105, 107). In this line, contemporary perceptions of 
youth and adulthood are the result of social and mental legacies of the post-war 
178 SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LXI (2019), N° 2
generation and continue to influence present thinking in Western societies in 
general (Blatterer, 2007a: 23; Chauvel, 2002).
Categories such as childhood, adolescence, adulthood or old age are artificial 
constructions created by specific societal conditions of a given time(Model et al., 
1976: 8). Once new classifications are identified in the popular discourse, new 
behaviours appear. Such changes occur as solutions when old practices no longer 
work (Furstenberg et al., 2005: 3). The stages of childhood and adolescence 
emerged at times when the societal structure was ready to acknowledge 
them. Similarly, transitions to adulthood evolve and adjust to wider structural 
transformations taking place.Social concepts, but also established institutions, 
are mutablerather than fixed.
Social regulations and transitional stages in advanced societies have 
developed around age as a marker, accentuating the transformation of physical 
age into social age (Buchmann, 1989: 25–29). This arrangement has generated 
separate social categories that determine the roles, identities and social positions 
of social actors. Age categories have engendered a normative system that 
pressurises individuals to conform to the norms associated with their age.The 
allocation of status based on age also leads to disapproving the behaviour of 
individuals perceivedas deviating from the supposedly normative social path 
(Sugarman, 1986: 50–52; Wyn and Woodman, 2006: 499, 511).In that sense, 
institutions and policy measures aimed at the youth and young adults may 
harm them if they are founded uponirrelevant assumptions about contemporary 
youth and outdated modelsthat no longer correspond to actual life experiences 
(Furlong et al., 2011: 367; Settersten, 2005: 536).The prevailing discourse on the 
prolongation of youth confuses the youth. A large proportion of young people 
are caught between dominant institutionalised ideologies and the inability 
and unwillingness to adhere to the beliefs of another generation. Rapid socio-
economic changes have provoked a rupture between post-war ideals and present 
possibilities for societal integration (Blatterer, 2007b: 63–64). Several scholars 
emphasise the difficulty for the youth to establish long-term plans due to socio-
economic uncertainty. Young people are compelled to be constantly alert and 
prepared for unexpected risks, live in the here-and-now to handle potential 
sudden hazards, and simultaneously plan their future strategically (Andrew 
et al., 2007; Arnett, 2004; Hartmann and Swartz, 2007; Mary, 2014; Molgat, 
2007; Pallas, 2007; Shanahan et al., 2005).Inconsistencies around the notion of 
adulthood imply that the theoretical framework for analysing contemporary 
pathways to adulthood is increasingly irrelevant and anachronistic, and needs 
re-evaluation.
Model et al. (1976: 16, 21) argue that in the nineteenth century, family 
represented a central institution for managing risks. Individuals were faced with 
sudden and unexpected hazardous occurrences, such as sudden sickness and/
or death, accidents, or frequent and extended redundancies. These devastating 
eventsmade it necessary for families to be prepared to face times of disasters. 
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Transitions were less secure, and hindered by uncertainty and possible risks. 
People were hence constrained to live in the here-and-now and on constant 
alertness.
The creation of welfare states after the Second World War, access to 
healthcare, employees’ rights, unemployment protection, and retirement 
pensions, reduced the importance of family in dealing with life hazards. The 
implementation of welfare systems and the socio-economic boom considerably 
reduced existential risks, rendered life morepredictable, and generated future and 
long-term planning. Individuals increasingly became more involved withnon-
familial institutions, such as education, training and career planning, while 
familial obligations considerably decreased (Model et al.; 1976: 21).However, 
these institutions require individuals to follow a specific timetable, such as 
becoming adult at a certain age and fulfilling specific markers, and reward 
those who manageto meet the prerequisites, but penalise those who fail to do 
so. By contrast, the nineteenth century family institution offered greater latitude 
with regards timing of actions, such as getting married and founding one’s own 
household. Individuals were expected to fulfil familial obligations and to display 
qualities such as maturity and personal abilities. Today, they are expected to 
follow a strict schedule based on established deadlines(Model et al., 1976:21; 
Shanahan et al., 2005: 229).
Ray and Settersten (2010: 21, 23) argue that to some extent, transitions today 
are returning to a more natural pattern, akin to those of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, when life was bound to farming and rural settings 
rather than the labour market. Becoming an adult then was a gradual process 
characterised by semi-autonomy, with young people waiting to be economically 
self-sufficient to set up independent households. Nineteenth century youth 
did not experience brief, ordered and predictable transitions as people today 
believe. They achieved some milestones of adulthood but did not complete the 
entire set of transitions immediately(Katz, cit. Model et al., 1976: 7). Today, a 
considerable number of young adults in most advanced countries experience 
a semi-autonomous status too, until their late twenties or early thirties, when 
they financially and/or residentially depend on their parents or state support, 
as a result of prolonging their studies or precarious employment (e.g. Arnett, 
2004; Côté, 2014; Eurofound, 2014; Galland, 1996; Mary, 2012; Van de Velde, 
2008). However, there are important differences in the ways they define and 
achieve adulthood: a large number of young peopleemphasise psychological 
aspects of adulthood such as maturity over the achievement of social markers. 
Life standards, choices and expectations have changed too. Additionally, young 
people are no longer bound to familial obligations as providers of economic 
support but financially continue to depend on their parents for longer (see 
Table 3).
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Table 3. The evolution of transitions to adulthood from the nineteenth to the 
early twenty-first centuries based on data from Finland and France.
HISTORICAL PERIODS
 TRANSITIONS 
CHARACTERISTICS
1800s–1900s 1950s–1970s 1980s–2010s
Main features of 
transitions
Diluted and scattered 
transitions, delay between 
statuses attainment
Accelerated 
and condensed 
transitions
Dispersed, lengthened, 
unpredictable 
transitions, blurred 
statuses
Societal aspects of 
transition process
Heterogeneous transitions 
across social classes and 
gender
Homogenisation of 
transitions across 
social classes and 
gender
Heterogeneous 
transitions across social 
classes, homogeneous 
transitions across 
gender (within classes); 
multiples transitions
Young adults’ social 
status
Semi-autonomous Autonomous Semi-autonomous
Process and timing Early entry into the labour 
force; later household 
formation
Early entry into the 
labour force and 
early household 
formation, almost 
simultaneously
Delayed entry into the 
labour force; delayed 
household formation
Institutional 
obligations
Bound to family 
obligations;support family 
of origins in early working 
life until marrying
Free from family 
obligations; 
obligations towards 
institutions (e.g. 
education, career, 
welfare state)
Free from family 
obligations but 
prolonged dependence 
on family and/or state 
support; obligations 
towards institutions 
(e.g. education, career, 
welfare state)
Adult status 
attribution 
requirements
Change in social status 
and personal behaviour 
(e.g. marriage, personal 
abilities and qualities)
Fulfilment of social 
criteria (e.g. working, 
marring, having 
children) 
Fulfilment of social 
criteria,and individual 
and psychological 
maturity
Social circumstances 
and behavioural 
adaptation
Traditions and 
expectations based on 
gender and social class
this framework left few 
options and choices
for individuals to manage 
life
But also: no welfare 
systems, life hazards and 
uncertainty
encouraged 
spontaneous response to 
sudden events
life model based 
on a structured and 
predictable lifeand here-
and-now approach
Socio-economic 
prosperity, stability, 
security, welfare 
systems
 future predictions 
possible
life model based 
on long-term 
planning
Socio-economic 
uncertainty, global 
forces, welfare systems, 
individual values, 
multiple possibilities
 anticipation of 
sudden change, 
assessing options, 
possible strategical 
response
life model based on 
a here-and-now and 
future planning mixed 
approach 
 Source: own construction.
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Examining transitions across time reveals that no particular patterns 
of transitions are correct or incorrect or can be used as a standard point of 
reference, in Finland and France, but most possibly in other western societies 
too. Today’s young people are often perceived as deviant or failing to become 
adults in the appropriate pace and manner because they are measured against 
another generation that came of age in a substantially different socio-historical 
landscape. The framework for transitions has transformed. Each historical era 
offers unique life circumstances. Times have changed, and so have life conditions, 
expectations, values, risks and chances. Young people are aware of those changes 
and adapt to their environment. They are simply setting up a new archetype for 
coming of age that mirrors contemporary times.
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